Hello everyone,Today, Abdullah shares his thoughts that the improvements proposed by the Turkish opposition will not be enough for the exit from the crisis, and that a new vision is needed which will redefine the role of the state.In addition, we have compiled the latest opinion polls on the desired characteristics of the opposition's presidential candidate and the feelings of the citizens about the course of the country.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Weekly politics publication focusing on Turkey, city agendas, and international policy.

Spektrum

The opposition's view of political economy and what needs to be improved

Weekly insights: The opposition's perspective

Hello everyone,AK Party government plans to make a constitutional change, in order to underline that a family can only be consisted “by a male and a female”. This means a constitutional obstacle in front of homosexual marriage is being constructed. Today, İlkim tells about the equality of marriage.Then, I tell about the increasing conflict in the Middle East. While Turkey is planning for a ground operation in Syria, the most far-right government in Israel’s history is coming to power. Moreover, the secular rebellion in Iran is still going on. The mullah regime’s disproportionate use of force risks the country’s territorial integrity and the region’s stability.&nbsp;We also summarized the recent opinion polls regarding to the current politics.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Spectrum first looks at the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and then examines gender dynamics in Turkey and around the world.

Weekly insights: Gender debates and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East

Hello everyone,Election time is approaching. However, we do not think that the values of the parties and their views on fundamental issues are adequately understood and discussed. Politics is shaped by daily discussions and becomes incapable of creating solutions.In this issue, I analyze the perspective of the People's Alliance, which consists of the AK Party, MHP and BBP, on fundamental rights. I try to highlight the overlaps or contradictions between programs and practice.Then, we summarized some latest opinion polls on the voter behaviour. These polls demonstrate the increasing popularity of imprisoned leader Selahattin Demirtaş among the HDP voters, the vote share of the alliances and the reputation of Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

İn this issue discussed the approach of political parties in Turkey to fundamental rights.

Weekly insights: approaches to fundamental rights in Turkey

Hello everyone,Today, I write about MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s surprise comments on the ruling party’s visit to the HDP officials.Then, Abdullah tells about Russian President Putin’s efforts to help President Erdoğan get reelected.We also summarized the latest opinion polls regarding to the economic crisis and the government’s social housing project.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Changing political dynamics in Turkey and the international alliance of power

Weekly insights: national and international relations in the run-up to the elections

Hello everyone,In this issue, İlkim shares her notes from the panel organized by Istanbul Economics Research in order to share the results of a youth study. She comments on the worrisome results on the youth’s perception of politics.Moreover, we compiled a survey about the headscarf issue and a summarized a report which demonstrates the extent of the forest fire disasters in Turkey.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

PREMIUM_CONTENT_REDACTED

Spectrum shares his conclusions on youth research.

Weekly insights: future concept in Turkey

In this issue Abdullah discusses the difficult path to a strong opposition. He examines the responsibilities of building the new Turkey.,We also summarized the latest opinion polls on the electoral behaviour.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Weekly insights: new Turkey objectives

Hello everyone,Today, senior journalist Ferai Tınç criticizes the recently ratified “disinformation law”, which would see those accused of spreading disinformation jailed for up to three years.In my article, I explain my thoughts on the weaknesses of the joint opposition which has recently lost its psychological superiority against the government. I claim announcing the joint presidential candidate and government program now might be a way to reverse the negative trend.We also summarized the latest opinion polls on the electoral behaviour.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Weekly insights: Turkey's oppositional dynamics

Hello everyone,&nbsp;Today, Abdullah writes on the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s latest strategy, which was criticized a lot by his own vote base. Abdullah analyzes the goals, strengths and weaknesses of this strategy.&nbsp;We also included latest surveys on lifestyle concerns and voter behavior in the newsletter.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

The opposition's strategy in the run-up to the elections is a matter of debate.

Weekly insights: political manoeuvres

Hello everyone,In this issue, İlkim analyses the possible presidential candidates of the opposition. She mentions the weaknesses and strengths of each person.Moreover, we summarised the latest polls regarding the electoral behaviour in Turkey.<ul fr-original-style="padding-inline-start: 20px;" style="padding-inline-start: 20px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1em; list-style-position: inside; box-sizing: border-box;"><li dir="ltr" fr-original-style="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">A cheerful recommendation: A weekly, practical guide to Istanbul for those who want to make this city their neighborhood. Every Sunday in your inbox.</li></ul><p contenteditable="false" fr-original-class="custom-button-wrapper fr-deletable" fr-original-style="text-align:center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1em; box-sizing: border-box;"><a bgcolor="#252c3c" color="#ffffff" contenteditable="false" fr-original-class="custom-button-link" fr-original-style="background-color:#252c3c !important;color:#fafbfc !important" href='https://link.apos.to/c/JIRwcLkiHfdd?c=Hk6EHTQBwvNK2Ak2_j9ez&s=web' rel="noreferrer" style="background-color: rgb(37, 44, 60) !important; color: rgb(250, 251, 252) !important; text-decoration: none; outline: none; cursor: pointer; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; touch-action: manipulation; user-select: auto; box-sizing: border-box;" target="_blank">SUBSCRIBE</a>Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

In this issue, we continue to analyze Turkey's electoral journey.

Weekly insights: Turkey towards election #2

Hello everyone,Nominating the “right candidate” is seen as a prerequisite for the opposition in order to win the presidential election. Today, İlkim writes about the necessary features of the candidate who is going to run against President ErdoğanMoreover, we summarized the latest opinion polls regarding politics and economics.Hope to see you next week,Bartu Özden

Weekly insights: Turkey towards elections

Politics related articles and publications

Politics

Social issues related articles and publications

Social Issues

On January 24, 1980, the economic reform program prepared by Turgut Özal, then-Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, and adopted by the Nationalist Front government headed by Süleyman Demirel, was a public announcement of a structural transformation that went down in history as the ‘January 24 Decisions’.Neoliberalism instead of the import-substitution systemThe import-substitution system, which had offered a development strategy to developing countries, particularly in Latin America, since the 1960s, was implemented in Turkey for about 20 years. However, it collapsed after a major currency crisis. Turgut Özal, who wanted to implement in Turkey the neoliberal economic policies pioneered by Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK in line with the global economic and political system, implemented a radical economic reform package which was prepared in this direction.<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/11/0/1670149773990.jpeg" style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.79" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">AAThe new political order and ideological doctrine created by the military coup of September 12, 1980, together with the restructuring of the economy in line with neoliberal reforms, created a new political-economic order that is still valid in 2022. One of the most prominent features of this new system, which has many goals and consequences, such as the systematic contraction of workers' rights, the suppression of trade union activities, the continuous growth of capital at the expense of labour, and the domination of labour, and the reduction of real wages, has been the redefinition of the duties and responsibilities of the state.Since 1980, the state apparatus, which was supposed to serve as a mediator, arbitrator, and bridge between workers and employers, or between the constitution and citizens, has allied with capital in almost every field against workers, citizens, and disadvantaged segments of society, while all institutions and law regulating the economy, politics, and social life have been designed by this job description.Patching instead of reformingIn this period, when we are about to enter the 100th anniversary of the Republic, the opposition parties that want to overthrow the authoritarian AKP government, which has been in power for 20 years, and rebuild a ‘democratic-secular-egalitarian’ Turkey have failed to produce a vision that would radically change the dominant ideology and political-economic order established in 1980, even though they have produced policies to reorganise the economy, politics and social life and prepared a constitutional amendment package for a radical reform, especially the opposition alliance. This blockage is most prominent in economic policies.<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/11/0/1670149810539.jpeg" style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.77" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">HabertürkThe policies proposed by the opposition parties to get out of the economic crisis, which has been going on since 2018, but has been dragging the middle and lower classes of society towards the hunger line since last year, do not fundamentally change the system. No reform package would reorganise the distribution of both income and wealth, revive the collapsing welfare state, and act as a mediator/arbitrator between labour and capital rather than siding with capital against labour. The economic reform packages and crisis exit prescriptions proposed by the CHP, İYİP, and DEVA Party do not propose a new economic model, but emphasise the idea that the current system is not working due to the wrong policies of the government and that the system can be put back on track with the right policies proposed by them.For example, Ali Babacan, the leader of the DEVA Party, states that during his ministerial term there was a large inflow of foreign resources into Turkey, but as a result of the authoritarianism of the government and the elimination of the rule of law, the inflow of foreign resources stopped and outflows began. While this proposition is partially true, Babacan's proposals for solutions and reforms for the Turkish economy do not go beyond suggesting that once his party comes to power, capital inflows to Turkey will increase again and per capita income will rise.Likewise, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu thinks that he can solve Turkey's chronic unemployment problem by ‘appointing a university graduate assistant to every muhtar’ or finding the solution to Turkey's low savings rate or current account deficit problems by attracting foreign investors from London to Turkey.These examples demonstrate that the opposition parties that want to overthrow the AKP government, which has ruled Turkey for 20 years, and build a new Turkey are unable to move even one step away from the dominant political-economic order and ideological domination that was put in place in 1980 and which experienced both its peak and collapse with the AKP. Created 42 years ago, we have repeatedly experienced that it is not possible to make a fundamental reform and create a new political, social and political-economic order with the existing institutions that regulate economic life in Turkey, one of the most advanced countries in the world in terms of income inequality, in a vicious and narrow political arena whose borders have been narrowed day by day during the AKP rule.Lessons to take from the Swedish modelPrevious experience shows how difficult it is to make a fundamental reform, build consensus among social actors, and create a new balance between capital and labour. But there are many examples to show that these are not impossible. In this sense, the political and economic transformations that took place in Sweden from the 1920s to the 1990s, even though the country is socially, politically, geographically, and economically very different from Turkey, will give us an idea of how it is possible to build a new system.The egalitarian and inclusive economic model created in Sweden, which has one of the strongest welfare systems in the world, is based on a long-standing state-capital-labour coalition. The state, which plays the role of mediator/arbitrator between capital and labour, is also the guarantor of the Swedish welfare model.The SDP (Social Democratic Party), which wanted to find a solution to the economic crisis of the late 1920s and to create an economic model targeting full employment, organised public hearings, and forums across the country to ensure that the ideas on which this new model was based were accepted by the society as well as politicians and bureaucrats. In this economic model, which emphasised full employment, strong social welfare mechanisms, and capital incentives; the state, which acted as a mediator between workers and employers, also reformed institutions and created new ones by this economic and political order.The point to highlight here is that, to fix the old system that was in a crisis, first of all, an idea to implement a new system should be put forward, and forums, meetings, and open sessions should be organised to ensure that it is accepted by all components of society, and then the existing institutions should be reformed according to the new order. To carry out a fundamental reform, it is necessary, first of all, to generate the ideas on which a new system is to be built, and for this to be accepted and adopted by society.Another important role of the state was to formalise and protect the informal agreement between workers and employers in the new economic model. In the economic order created with the goal of stable economic growth for employers and full employment for the working class, institutions were structured in line with these objectives. After about 20 years of institutional transformation and establishment of order, by the 1950s, the institutions that created the welfare state model in Sweden were in a stable state of functioning. The Swedish model of social democracy was based on the ideas of full employment, equality, and welfare.‘Without these ideas, the construction of such an institutional order would have been impossible.’ says Prof. Mark Blythe, who has done important work in the field of political economy, about the social democracy implemented in Sweden. Today, we see that the CHP claims to create an ‘equal and just economic order’ by emphasising its social democratic identity. However, the implementation of social democracy in Turkey can only be achieved if the existing institutions and the political and economic system undergo a radical change and the idea of social democracy is embraced by social actors. Therefore, it does not seem possible to change the current economic system based on deep inequalities by making small changes to the existing system or adding new ones to the existing institutions.<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/11/0/1670149857879.jpeg" style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.79" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">Sverige RadioIn the 1970s, as the working class demanded greater rights and employers saw their profits decline, the social democratic system that had been established in Sweden in the 1930s began to slowly break down. Although major developments in the global economy, particularly the oil crisis, had an impact on the Swedish economy, it was the breakdown of the consensus between workers and employers that started the transformation of the system. While the employers had reached a consensus among themselves to change the existing system, in 1976, a pro-capitalist centre-right coalition came to power by overthrowing the Social Democratic Party. Under normal circumstances, the centre-right coalition was expected to make a radical transformation of the economy, taking into account the demands of the owners of capital.In a political and economic system in which the institutional structure established in the 1930s was functional, the right-wing parties failed to implement the reforms expected of them and faced a strong reaction from the owners of capital. The prime minister of the time is quoted as saying ‘Because we are still bound by the ideas of the working class.’ when asked, ‘Why do we still produce policies in favour of the working class despite having a pro-capitalist government?’. To overcome this intellectual and institutional entrapment, employers pursue long-term policies, creating a new economic model that will produce results in favor of capital through think tanks and sharing it with the public, while at the same time carrying out promotional activities with large advertising budgets so that the ideas of the new model are accepted by both politicians and society. They fund academia in the same way, constantly funding studies on the effects and benefits of neoliberal policies. As a result, both the establishment and the transformation of social democracy in Sweden are only possible if strong ideas about a new economic order are created and accepted by society, politics, and economic actors.Being able to go beyond the current boundariesIn the 2023 general elections, we see that the opposition alliance, which set out with the goal of rebuilding a democratic Turkey, could not go beyond the political and economic boundaries established in the 1980s, which are still dominant today. In an economic order where social income inequality is increasing day by day, the establishment of a system based on social democracy, as the CHP claims, can only be possible by producing a new idea, reaching a consensus between workers, employers, and the state, and reforming the entire institutional structure according to this new consensus.We can say that the same change is valid for the constitutional amendment package. The constitutional amendment package, which was prepared only by reaching a consensus among the party staff, will not be more than a small patch on the existing system unless it reflects a social demand and a social consensus is reached. If we want to redraw the boundaries of politics and build a new economic model based on equality, prosperity, and production, we need to come up with a strong and new idea to build these elements upon.

Political economy, social democracy and the power of ideas

Following the terrorist attack in Taksim, Turkey launched a military campaign against the terrorist organisation PKK and its extension YPG in the northern regions of Iraq and Syria ‘to eliminate terrorist attacks, ensure border security, and eliminate terrorism at its source.’ Pençe-Kılıç (Claw-Sword) organised the air campaign. President Erdoğan said ‘It will not be limited to an air campaign’ and signaled that a ground campaign is on the way.While the terrorist organisation threatened Turkey after the campaign, two people, including a child, were killed in rocket attacks in Gaziantep and Kilis. Many people were injured.Impending dangers in Afghanistan and IsraelClashes broke out on Sunday night in the border region between the Taliban, who took control of Afghanistan last year, and Pakistan, where Imran Khan's government was ousted in April. Although tensions have been reduced, it is obvious that the two administrations, which cannot agree on the control of the area called the Durand Line, will face each other again.In Israel, former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to form the most nationalist government in the country's history with the support of the far right, who do not recognise Palestine's right to exist and think that Israel should annex all of Palestine.The revolt continues in IranAlthough all this suggests that the Middle East is rapidly moving towards a conflictual process, the real storm is brewing in Iran, where anti-regime protests have spread throughout the country.The anti-regime protests, which started more than two months ago after the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, who was detained by the morality police for not wearing her headscarf ‘properly’, continue. Political scientist Arif Keskin argues that ‘the loss of hope for reform in the country has given all protests an anti-regime character.’In the country where student boycotts in high schools and universities and shopkeepers' strikes in the cities, security forces have been trying to suppress the revolt with increasingly harsh methods in recent days.Activists confirm that the number of people killed in the demonstrations has exceeded 400, including at least 47 children. In the country, where the funerals of the killed citizens also turned into anti-regime demonstrations, it is seen that the religious leader Ali Khamenei, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by the US, or other symbols of the regime were destroyed and police stations were burnt. The turbans of the mullahs continue to be the target of the demonstrators. It is stated that more than 15 thousand arrests have been made so far, and six demonstrators have been sentenced to death.There were clashes in some regions, and security forces were killed. The funerals of the killed security forces are also turned into pro-state demonstrations by the mullah regime. The regime continues to see the protests as ‘provocation of the West and acts of terrorism.’While there are resignations in Iranian state media, national team athletes support the protests by not singing the national anthem in competitions, and artists make anti-regime statements. The Iranian anti-regime diaspora scattered around the world continues to spread the protests around the world.The uprising, which has made history with the slogans of ‘women, life, freedom’ and ‘death to the dictator,’ is for now melting ethnic and ideological differences and uniting the society in secularism against the mullah regime. On the other hand, in regions where Azeri Turks and Kurds are the majority, the uprisings have the potential to take on a separatist character.Iran-Azerbaijan tensionIran had adopted a position supporting Armenia in Azerbaijan's war to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian occupation. In addition to the impact of the planned opening of the Zangezur corridor on Iran's trade, Tehran was reportedly concerned about Turkey's growing influence in the region, the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Israel, and the development of relations between Azeri Turks in Iran and Azerbaijan.&nbsp;Earlier this month, an ‘illegal armed group’ established by Iranian intelligence in Azerbaijan was deciphered, and Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel. Today, in the city of Tabriz, where Azerbaijani Turks live in large numbers, the slogans ‘Azerbaijani nation, it cannot bear this weakness’ and ‘freedom, justice, the national government’ are becoming increasingly audible.While the northwest of Iran is called ‘South Azerbaijan’, the number of Azeri Turks living in the country is estimated to be 25 million. The total population of Azerbaijan is just over 10 million.Iran's attack on Northern IraqIn Iran's Kurdistan province, violent protests and separatist slogans have been heard since Amini was killed. The fact that Amini was a young woman of Kurdish origin increases the anger in the region even more. Especially in the city of Mahabad, it is stated that the intervention of the regime forces in the demonstrations has reached the level of ‘massacre’.In addition, Iran has announced that it targets the headquarters of the armed Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party (IKDP) and the Komele Labourers' Party in the northern Iraqi cities of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah with missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles ‘to ensure border security’, which it claims are fuelling protests in the country. On 28 September, 14 November, and 20 November, some people lost their lives in the attacks. While Iran is demanding the Iraqi government disarm these groups, it is stated that the clashes may escalate if the Peshmerga forces respond.Although it is stated that PJAK, the Kurdish separatist PKK-linked terrorist organisation in Iran, supports the anti-regime demonstrations, it is commented that ‘the recently increasing Iran-PKK rapprochement has enabled the terrorist organisation PKK to gain a blackmail trump card over Iran through PJAK.’ Iran, in turn, sends its message to the separatist Kurdish movement by attacking the IKDP, which ‘competes with PJAK in its claim to represent, lead and protect the Kurdish community.’With its disproportionate use of force against the democratic reaction of the people, the mullah regime in Iran jeopardises not only its territorial integrity but also the stability of the entire Middle East.

Days of conflict in the Middle East

Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ announced last week that ‘We will probably submit the constitutional amendment proposal to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey next week’ and stated that the proposal will be submitted to parliament this week. Another title of the constitutional amendment, which also includes the ‘legalisation of the headscarf’, is ‘protection of the family'.At the beginning of this month, President Erdoğan said, ‘Strong families give birth to strong nations. Let us create strong families so that we can be a strong nation. A weak family weakens a strong nation. We do not want to give this opportunity.’&nbsp;One step behind: President Erdoğan responded to CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu's call for ‘legalising the headscarf’ with a call for a ‘constitutional amendment’. Erdoğan said, ‘Let's not stop there, let's make additional amendments that will strengthen our family institution, which consists of the union of men and women, and enable us to look to our future with confidence.’Why? There have been anti-LGBTQIA+ discourses in Turkey for a long time. In recent months, a rally called ‘Big Family Meeting’ was organised, banners with anti-LGBTQIA+ statements were carried and slogans were chanted. Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu has made opposing discourses many times, and in a statement he made in August, he said, ‘This is why they want to unleash LGBTI or what is it, sexlessness on this country. First they will acclimatise, and then they will take our children away from us. We see all of these.’ In October, Minister of Industry and Technology Mustafa Varank said, ‘You can do whatever you want, but if you impose sexlessness, if you continue to undermine the concept of family, we will not say goodbye to anyone.’What will happen?&nbsp;Minister of Justice Bozdağ stated that paragraphs will be added to Article 24 of the Constitution, and the first paragraph of Article 41 will be amended. While Article 24 is expected to be amended regarding the headscarf, Article 41 is expected to be amended to read ‘The family is the foundation of Turkish society and is based on equality between spouses.’ It is believed that the word ‘spouses’ will be replaced with ‘men and women.’&nbsp;It is stated that with this word change, it is planned to constitutionally prevent marriage equality. Currently, no same-sex unions are recognised in Turkey, nor are marriages or similar unions outside the country. Marriage is restricted between a man and a woman by the article in the Civil Code which reads: ‘The man and woman who are to marry each other apply together to the marriage registrar's office in the place where one of them resides…’.&nbsp;How is it in other countries?&nbsp;In the image below, you can see the latest status of legal regulations on marriage equality and homosexuality.Today, marriage equality is recognised in the USA and most European countries. Although there are discourses against LGBTQIA+s in almost every country, countries acknowledge their existence in legal status and approve of their marriage rights. Of course, this process has not been going on for a long time but has been developing rapidly, especially in the last 10 years. If we look at a few countries:&nbsp;Netherlands:&nbsp;The Netherlands was the first country to legalise marriage equality. With the decision taken on 1 April 2001, homosexual couples were granted the same rights as heterosexual couples, including adoption.&nbsp;Belgium:&nbsp;In Belgium, where marriage equality was legalised in 2003, same-sex couples were granted the right to adopt children in 2006.&nbsp;Spain: In Spain, where marriage equality was legalised in 2005, couples can adopt whether they are married or not.&nbsp;Canada: Marriage equality in the country entered national law in July 2005 and was legalised nationwide. Before this period, it was legal in some provinces.South Africa:&nbsp;The first African country to allow marriage equality, South Africa legalised adoption in November 2006.Norway: the country's 2009 law paved the way for same-sex couples to marry and adopt, but for the past 20 years same-sex couples have enjoyed many of the same legal rights as unmarried heterosexual couples, under the term 'civil partnership'.Sweden: Since 1995, civil partnerships have been recognised, and in 2003 couples were granted the right to adopt a child. In May 2009, it was legalised for couples to marry in a civil or religious ceremony.&nbsp;France:&nbsp;In April 2013, a bill allowing marriage equality and adoption was approved by the parliamentary plenary and signed into law by the president.Argentina:&nbsp;On 14 July 2010, Argentina became the first South American country to have marriage equality and adoption rights after the law was passed by parliament.USA:&nbsp;In 1996, a federal law called the Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage as ‘the union of one man and one woman’. The law was canceled by the Constitutional Court in 2013. However, marriage equality had previously been legalised in several states, including Massachusetts, California, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that marriage equality is a legal right and legalised it across the country. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the judgment, said, ‘No union is deeper than marriage.’United Kingdom:&nbsp;Marriage equality is now legal in all parts of the United Kingdom, although it was recognized at different times in different regions.&nbsp;Switzerland:&nbsp;Same-sex marriage became legal as of 1 July 2022 after it was approved in a referendum held in September 2021.Taiwan:&nbsp;Taiwan's Parliament passed the legalisation of marriage equality in 2019. Taiwan became the first Asian country to take this decision, and approved the right to adoption, albeit in a limited way, with the same law.Mexico: In Mexico, same-sex marriages became legal throughout the country, with the northeastern border state of Tamaulipas also approving marriage equality.&nbsp;On the other hand, especially in Middle Eastern countries, it is seen that LGBTQIA+ persons are not recognised for their fundamental human rights and are subjected to criminal sanctions due to their sexual orientation.&nbsp;Is family unity achieved by men and women?&nbsp;Stating that a strong family constitutes a strong society, President Erdoğan had stated that with the regulation to be made, ‘They will set a barrier against threats to the family institution and human nature.’&nbsp;Just the other day, AKP Deputy Chairman Hayati Yazıcı said about the regulation on the institution of the family, ‘Family unity consists of the marriage of a man and a woman, it is as clear as that. Can there be a citizen against this?’However, when compared to the rest of the world, it is possible to see that marriage is guaranteed as a constitutional right in many countries, and that the union between two people and sexual orientation is also recognised as a fundamental right and freedom. It would not be wrong to say that all countries attach importance to family and family unity and regard it as the basic building block of society. In this context, when we evaluate the changes and decisions taken by countries over the years, we can say that family unity and strength can be achieved through free and equal rights rather than marriage between men and women. &nbsp;<blockquote fr-original-style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px;" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px; margin: 0px 0px 1em; border-left-style: solid; box-sizing: border-box;">‘Homosexuals must also be legally secured within the framework of their rights and freedoms. We do not find the treatment they are subjected to from time to time on some television screens humane.’ -Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 2002</blockquote>

Marriage equality: Does the family unit consist of a man and a woman?

AKP's view on fundamental rightsStating that fundamental human rights and freedoms are ‘the achievement of humanity as a result of centuries-long struggles’ the AKP program indexes the indicator of being a civilised society to the level of these freedoms. It argues that freedoms are also the foundation of democracy. The program states that ‘the most significant element of trust in a society is the belief of the individuals living in it that their rights and freedoms are respected’ and that this respect ensures the adoption of the democratic regime by the society and the protection of social peace.In the field of fundamental rights, the party promises that ‘the standards of international conventions to which Turkey is a party, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, will be implemented.’ It promises that the views of civil society will be taken into account, that the freedoms of the press, thought, and expression will be built based on international standards, and that secularism will not be interpreted as hostility to religion. While emphasising the sensitivities of religious people, it states that religion cannot be an instrument of pressure on people who have different lifestyles.It is claimed that freedom to seek rights and the right to a fair trial will be ensured, a transparent environment will be created on issues such as torture and disappearances, and the rights and freedoms of women, children, and labour will be based on international standards. With all these, it is stated that trust in state institutions will increase.Problems in practiceIt would not be wrong to say that how fundamental rights are addressed in the AKP's program contradicts its power practices. In 2002, the AKP, which came to power on its own by adopting a ‘conservative democratic’ line and with the support of liberals, promised to fight against the ‘3Ys’; prohibitions (yasaklar), poverty (yoksulluk), and corruption (yolsuzluk). The AKP government's approach to fundamental rights, which at the time was seen by some as libertarian as an anti-thesis of the 28 February period, while others argued that it has always had a prohibitionist mentality, changed significantly after the Gezi protests in 2013. The reformist Human Rights Action Plan announced in March 2021 with the vision of ‘a free individual, a strong society, a more democratic Turkey’ which also emphasises the rule of law, was not implemented.<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/10/0/1668937048947.jpeg" style="display: block; float: none; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.79" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; float: none; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">AAIt can be argued that the biggest apparent contradiction today is the non-implementation of some ECtHR judgments, despite the program stating that ECtHR standards would be respected. The ECHR's rulings on the release of businessperson Osman Kavala, who has been imprisoned for more than five years, and former HDP co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been imprisoned for more than six years, are not being implemented. These people, whom government officials accuse in the strongest possible terms, are being held in prison on different indictments designed to circumvent the ECtHR judgments. These cases are cited as clear examples of the destruction of judicial independence. It is said that Turkey could be expelled from the Council of Europe as a result of the violation process initiated under the AKP's rule.It is also assessed that the AKP, which does not establish regular relations with civil initiatives other than civil society organisations that include people associated with the party, restricts freedom of expression and freedom of information through the recently enacted disinformation law, also known as the ‘censorship law.’ Turkey ranks 149th out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. &nbsp;Although it is stated that ‘religion cannot be an element of oppression,’ the demands of LGBTQIA+ persons are ignored on the grounds of religious sensitivities. Although it is stated that ‘the government will be transparent on issues such as torture and disappearances,’ the Saturday Mothers, who have been searching for their missing children since the 1980s, are not allowed to protest. Moreover, President Erdoğan met with the Saturday Mothers when he was prime minister in 2011.Despite the promises of working life, the report of the Worker's Health and Safety Assembly shows that the number of workers who lost their lives in occupational homicides in the first nine months of 2022 reached 1359.The determination in the party program that the state's approach to fundamental rights is directly related to society's trust in institutions is quite reasonable. On the other hand, regular surveys conducted by research companies show that trust in public institutions, except the Turkish Armed Forces, is gradually decreasing. In other words, the AKP's program confirms that the government's approach to fundamental rights is contrary to what was promised.Unanswered questionsAlthough I have sent the following three questions to different AKP officials and committees regarding the contradictions between the text of the program and its implementation, I have not received any responses. I would like to state that if the party sends answers to these questions, we will publish them as they are.The AKP program defines human rights as a ‘prerequisite for democracy.’ On the other hand, opposition circles criticise the AKP for indexing democracy to the ‘ballot box’ and ignoring the basic principles of democracy other than voting. Similarly, the program states that ‘Freedom of thought and expression will be built based on international standards, opinions will be freely expressed and differences will be seen as a richness.’ On the other hand, it is criticised that the disinformation law charging the offense of ‘disseminating misleading information’ with imprisonment and the fact that the judiciary will decide what constitutes misleading information restricts freedom of expression. How would you respond to these criticisms on this example or a principal level?The party program states, ‘The standards in the field of human rights set by international conventions to which Turkey is a party, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, will be put into practice.’As you know, the European Convention on Human Rights establishes the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey has been criticised in Europe for not complying with the ECtHR judgments in Kavala and Demirtaş cases. How would you respond to these criticisms?Your party program states that ‘The opinions and suggestions of voluntary and non-governmental organisations active in the field of human rights will be taken into consideration, and close cooperation will be established between state organs and these organisations.’ Can you explain the steps taken in this field?MHP's view on fundamental rightsThe MHP states in its program that ‘every human being has rights and&nbsp;freedoms arising from being a human being’ and assigns to the state the duty of ‘protecting and developing the inviolable, inalienable fundamental rights and freedoms of human beings, especially the right to life.’The MHP program defines fundamental rights as the inviolability of the person, freedom of thought and opinion, freedom to seek rights and equality before the law, privacy and inviolability of private life, freedom of religion and conscience, right to education and training, right to organisation, right to organise meetings and demonstrations, rights of women and children, freedom of the press and press ethics.On the other hand, the program justifies restrictions on fundamental rights, arguing that such restrictions can only be imposed ‘provided that they do not pose a threat to national security, the fundamental characteristics of the Republic, the indivisible integrity of the state with its country and nation, public order, public morality, public health and the exercise of fundamental rights by others.’<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/10/0/1668936883012.jpeg" style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.51" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">AARestricting rights with vague definitionsThe MHP stands out as the party whose program overlaps most with the implementation of the People's Alliance on fundamental rights. While emphasizing the importance of fundamental rights, it both defines a duty for the state and argues that even the most basic rights can be restricted when necessary, just like today. On the other hand, restricting fundamental rights with concepts such as "public morality and public order", the legal definition of which can vary from person to person, paves the way for authoritarianism. Moreover, it foments revengeful feelings among social groups whose rights are currently being restricted.<img src="https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images.aposto.com/2022/10/0/1668936996097.jpeg" style="display: block; float: none; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px; border-style: none; position: relative; cursor: pointer; padding: 0px 1px; box-sizing: border-box;" ratio="1.51" width="550" fr-original-style="display: block; float: none; vertical-align: top; margin: 5px auto; text-align: center; width: 100%; max-width: 550px;" fr-original-class="fr-draggable">DHADiscourse contradicting the programIn its program, the BBP, unlike the MHP, has a libertarian perspective on fundamental rights, just like the AKP. However, the critical language used in the program is not reflected in daily politics. The party maintains its support for the People's Alliance instead of criticising the AKP's practices restricting fundamental rights, which contradict its program, from a libertarian perspective. In addition, the party's conservative stance on social issues also reduces the credibility of its libertarianism on fundamental rights.For example, party leader Mustafa Destici said in 2016 about the LGBTQIA+ Pride March, ‘Let them go and march wherever they want, they cannot march in my hometown. My hometown cannot be portrayed as a country of perverts.’ His words contradict the party's criticism of the restriction of the right to assembly, demonstration, and march, and overlap with prohibitionist practices.&nbsp;

How do the parties of the People's Alliance view our fundamental rights?

MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, in perhaps the most awaited group meeting speech in a long time, described the visit of the AKP delegation to HDP on the constitutional amendment as ‘a natural and right step.’ In the relevant part of his speech,what Bahçeli said is as follows:&nbsp;<blockquote fr-original-style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px;" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px; margin: 0px 0px 1em; border-left-style: solid; box-sizing: border-box;">‘Why did they meet with the HDP? What will we say, and how will we react to this? These are the hypothetical questions whose answers have been sought for days. I don't even need to repeat how we look at the HDP. It is a devastating and mischievous attitude for those who don't make a sound about the AKP delegation's contact with the CHP to talk about the HDP on our backs. In our eyes, the CHP is the same as the HDP. We do not look at what was discussed, we look at how a reasonable and democratic solution will be found.’</blockquote>The controversial visitThe AKP, which needs 360 votes to take the constitutional amendment to the referendum and 400 votes to adopt it without a referendum, has visited all parties with a group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. On 2 November, Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, AKP Deputy Chairman Ali İhsan Yavuz, and AKP Group Deputy Chairman Mustafa Elitaş visited the HDP delegation for the constitutional amendment proposal prepared by the AKP on domestic relations and religious freedom.After the visit, AKP Şanlıurfa MP Mehmet Ali Cevheri said, ‘It is absurd not to go. It is a legal party, established according to the law. It operates under the roof of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and has a group. We also need their support.’Former AKP MP Mehmet Metiner said, ‘If entering into dialogue-cooperation with the HDP is a requirement of the vision of the Turkish Century, then would it be right to criticise the HDP by equating it with the PKK, and would it be right to blame others who are in dialogue-cooperation with the HDP? Is it only right when we do something?’. Metiner argued that ‘every word that will be said about the HDP from now on will run on empty.’AKP executive Şamil Tayyar said, ‘The AK Party should conduct its relations with the HDP on the same level as it sees it. If it is a political extension of the PKK and a party that needs to be shut down, why are we discussing the Constitution with them? If the PKK is separate from the HDP, why did we need to use such a language and tone that put them in the same equation?’İYİP Spokesperson Kürşad Zorlu said, ‘Indeed, parties should not use their standards of judgment to win elections. An understanding that anything is legitimate to win elections will lead to a problem of legitimacy in which the society and politics are at the center. It is an unacceptable approach.’CHP Spokesperson Faik Öztrak said, ‘If you are doing politics of values and principles, you will bear the consequences. What you said before this, what you are doing now, I leave this to the consideration of our nation.’&nbsp;Former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş said, ‘Instead of taking a share from this meeting and starting a fast meeting traffic with the HDP, the representative of legitimate politics, the opposition preferred to turn it into a storm to wear down the AKP and implicitly criminalise the HDP. It is inconceivable.’ He reacted to the opposition with these sentences. Demirtaş said that ‘no one can ignore the HDP’ and called on the opposition to ‘come together to form a realistic program to end poverty, hunger, war, and despair.’Why was there an expected reaction from the MHP?AKP Group Deputy Chairman Mahir Ünal, who had harshly criticised the language revolution in recent weeks, resigned from his post after Bahçeli's heavy criticism. It was interpreted that this development could be an indicator of a disagreement within the People's Alliance (Millet İttifakı).The People's Alliance had long accused the HDP of being the political representative of the terrorist organisation PKK. The opposition parties' contact with the HDP was condemned. The CHP was associated with the PKK due to the meetings between the CHP and the HDP, and the thesis that the HDP was the ‘sleeping partner’ of the six-party alliances despite forming a separate alliance with the socialist parties was being processed. Even the CHP's alliance partner İYİP, which had no contact with the HDP, was labeled a ‘PKK supporter.’ Efforts were being made to create a crack in the six-party table through the nationalist sensitivities of the İYİP.This understanding, which excluded the HDP from legitimate political grounds, was narrowing the opposition's room for maneuver. Although it was obvious that HDP voters would be one of the decisive electoral groups in the second round of the two-round election system, no policy was (could) formulated to address this reality.Journalist İsmail Saymaz wrote on Monday that an MHP official told him that they had learned about the AKP’'s visit to the HDP from the press. As the visit brought with it allegations that a new opening process was on the way, there were expectations that Bahçeli might demand early elections or show a harsh reaction to the AKP as a ‘balancing act.’Expanding the political spaceAccording to journalist Hande Fırat's reports from the MHP lobbies, the party, which ‘has not changed its view on the HDP,’ thinks that the AKP’'s view on the HDP cannot change and that ‘it cannot make a new initiative anyway.’ Thinking that the CHP and the HDP are the same, the MHP does not find it strange that the AKP, which goes to the CHP, goes to the HDP.’ In other words, we may be waiting for a period in which it becomes clear that the AKP and the MHP, which have recently become identical, are two political parties in the alliance.The AKP’'s proposal for a constitutional amendment to the CHP's proposal for a legal guarantee for headscarves is likely to further complicate politics. The AKP's proposal to change the definition of family to block same-sex marriages in the constitution, in addition to legalising the headscarf, puts the CHP in an unwanted dilemma. The use of closed ballots in constitutional amendments also paves the way for parties to ‘set traps’ for one another, for unexpected parties to vote in the same direction, or for MPs to violate party discipline.For the time being, it can be interpreted that the opposition parties have strengthened their hand against the accusation of ‘anyone in contact with HDP is a terrorist sympathiser’ and the government's national security and survival discourse has weakened. In the article published in Spektrum titled ‘The thorn-filled road of opposition: Opposition in the State of Emergency,’ the promise of the opposition parties to build a new Turkey depends on ‘refusing to do opposition to the extent permitted by the government.’

‘A natural and right step’

With the rapprochement process following the 15 July coup attempt, Turkey-Russia relations have evolved into a ‘strategic partnership’ based on the close personal relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Erdoğan. The acquisition of Russia's S-400 air defense systems, which led to Turkey's exclusion from the next-generation F-35 fighter jet project, has added a new dimension to Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey's place in both NATO and the Western alliance has also been questioned.After Russia invaded Ukraine, almost all Western countries, especially the US and the UK, imposed sanctions on Russia as an alliance, while Turkey's strategy was to sell TB-2 unmanned aerial vehicles to Ukraine on the one hand and to deepen its economic and political relations with Russia on the other. This policy, which is defined as ‘politics of balance’ in the international relations literature, although seemingly pragmatic for Turkey, ushered in a new era in which relations with Russia directly intervened in Turkey's domestic politics. The fact that mutual relations were conducted at the level of leaders also paved the way for Putin and Erdoğan to instrumentalise their diplomatic relations for their interests to maintain their power.Record trade volume and Russian capital flowing to TurkeyFollowing the invasion of Ukraine, many Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia in all areas, especially in trade, defense industry, technology, and finance, and Russia's relations with the Western world were completely severed, so to speak. As giant companies such as Mercedes, Apple, and McDonald's left Russia one by one, Turkey-based companies started to fill the gap in the market. For example, after Reebok decided to exit Russia in May, Turkey-based shoe manufacturer FLO bought more than 100 Reebok stores in the country. In addition, it was announced that companies such as Fiba, Anadolu Efes, İpekyol, and Mudo will increase their activities in Russia by benefitting from the emerging market gap in Russia.The statements of Şeref Fayat, Chairman of the Apparel and Ready-to-Wear Industry Assembly of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), summarise Turkey's strategy to fill the market gap that emerged with the exit of Western countries:<blockquote fr-original-style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px;" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px; margin: 0px 0px 1em; border-left-style: solid; box-sizing: border-box;">‘Although things did not improve in Ukraine, it became clear that there were some opportunities in Russia. Thanks to the sanctions, the American, French, and German companies there, in other words, the European companies exiting from that market, naturally increased the demand in the same regions a little more. They became less competitive. Therefore, there has been an important orientation towards Turkish brands both in opening new stores and making new investments.’</blockquote>While Russia was the dominant party in Turkey-Russia relations before the invasion of Ukraine, the economic effects of the sanctions and the diplomatic isolation brought about by political isolation turned out to Turkey’s advantage in the relations between the two countries. Today, it is possible to define Turkey-Russia relations as ‘interdependent.’ While Turkey has gained vital importance as Russia's gateway to the world, the fact that Turkey-based companies filled the gap in the Russian market has played a major role in the business world's continued loyalty to the government despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, many Russian business people moved their capital to Turkey, established thousands of companies, and started to use Turkey as a logistics centre to reach the European market. Looking at the figures, Turkey-Russia trade reached $50 billion in 2022, up from $34.7 billion in 2021.The Russian capital, seeking a safe harbour in the face of the threat of sanctions by Western countries and the risk of confiscation by the Russian government, started to flock to Turkey as a result of the AKP government's policies encouraging all kinds of capital inflows regardless of their origin. Between January and August, 729 companies with Russian capital were established in Turkey, and the total capital of these companies reached 360 million liras.&nbsp;Property purchases constitute another dimension of the story. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian citizens had a great interest in buying real estate, especially in southern cities such as Antalya, but after the invasion, record levels were reached in real estate sales.Between January and September, the number of houses purchased by Russian and Ukrainian citizens in Turkey reached 11,086 and the number of houses purchased by Russian citizens increased by 200% compared to 2021. The number of Russian tourists to Turkey reached 3 million between January and August, providing short-term relief to the economy's growing need for foreign currency.On 5 August, Erdogan and Putin met in Sochi and made a series of agreements that will benefit both leaders to stay in power. Following the meeting between the two leaders, the Russian energy company Rosatom, which is building the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, injected more than $5 billion of foreign currency into the CBRT reserves under the name of the capital increase, and it was announced that the total amount to be transferred to Turkey would reach $15 billion.President Erdoğan also announced that the Russian credit card system Mir, which was sanctioned by the EU, will be put into use in Turkey. Regarding the unregistered foreign currency inflow, former CBRT Chief Economist Prof. Dr. Hakan Kara said on his Twitter account, ‘The current account deficit is exploding, there is no registered capital inflow, yet why are foreign exchange reserves not depleted? Because the inflow of unregistered financing is at the peak of history’ and drew attention to the unregistered Russian capital entering Turkey.While the sanctions imposed on the energy sector, which is Russia's biggest source of income, caused major energy and financial crises in EU countries, Russia's shift of its export market to the Asian market, especially China and India, enabled it to compensate for the loss of the market in Europe to a great extent. The fact that energy prices reached record highs across the world also provided Russia with a large income and allowed it to expand its diplomatic room for maneuver. President Erdoğan's policy of financing the current account deficit, which has increased due to the currency crisis and high inflation, with capital transfers from Russia is also based on this foundation. Putin's goal of keeping Erdoğan, whom he sees as a useful partner against NATO, in power is materialised through capital transfers to Turkey via Russian oligarchs.Natural gas gesture to TurkeyAnother significant dimension of Turkey-Russia relations is natural gas. Vladimir Putin, who stopped the flow of gas to Europe in response to the sanctions, is using energy resources as a weapon against Western countries by threatening Europe with freezing this winter if the sanctions are not lifted and the support to Ukraine is not stopped. On the other hand, by granting unprecedented concessions in natural gas to Turkey, which he sees as an ally, Putin aims to prolong President Erdoğan's stay in power.Following the meeting in Sochi, it was agreed that Turkey would make most of its natural gas payments in roubles. However, the government, which has largely depleted its foreign currency resources to control the decline in the Turkish lira, agreed with Russia to make some of its natural gas payments in roubles. It even went a step further and offered to postpone natural gas payments until 2024. Although there is no official response from Russia yet, it is seen that this offer is likely to be accepted. Having cut off the gas flow to Europe via Nord Stream, Russia plans to increase Turkey's importance in terms of energy security by sending some of the natural gas to Europe via the Turkish Stream. The latest step in this regard was Putin's announcement of a plan to turn Turkey into ‘Europe's largest natural gas hub.’ President Erdoğan welcomed this plan and stated that Thrace is the most suitable place to become a gas hub and that concrete steps will be taken soon.The impact of Erdogan-Putin friendship on the 2023 electionsErdoğan has seized the historic opportunity created for him by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and expanded his room for maneuver in the international arena as the only NATO member to maintain relations with Russia. Aware that Turkey is Russia's only gateway to the West, Putin attaches great importance to Erdoğan's victory in the 2023 elections to prolong the life of his rule and avoid a defeat in the invasion of Ukraine. Putin, who has become heavily dependent on Turkey as Russia's gateway to the West, is forced to ignore even the TB-2 armed unmanned aerial vehicles sent by Bayraktar to Ukraine or the support provided by Turkey to Ukraine.Recognising that a possible change of government in Turkey would require a more institutional framework between Turkey and Russia rather than personal interests, Putin is aware that Erdoğan's staying in power is also significant for his power. In this sense, knowing that the biggest threat to President Erdoğan's power before the 2023 elections is the economic crisis, he is making moves that could provide short-term relief to the government.&nbsp;Capital inflows of uncertain origin, which are shown as ‘net errors and omissions,’ the plan to postpone some of the energy payments, which are the biggest cause of the current account deficit, until 2024, or increasing Erdoğan's credibility in the international arena through his role in the grain deal can be shown as concrete examples of Putin's intervention in the 2023 elections, albeit indirectly. The temporary control of the exchange rate through the transfer of foreign resources and the government's creation of an electoral economy by opening the treasury's taps to the fullest with moves to balance the current account deficit have been steadily increasing both President Erdoğan's approval rating, the rate of those who think that Erdoğan will win the election, and the AKP's vote share for some time.Against this backdrop, to win the 2023 elections, the opposition needs to win the voter's confidence in domestic politics and defeat the government, as well as end international support for the authoritarian regime in Turkey.

‘Alliance of Authoritarian Leaders’ and the 2023 elections

The youth survey, conducted by Istanbul Economics Research with the support of the Fredrich Naumann Foundation, contains significant findings on the views of young people between the ages of 18 and 30 on politics, Turkey, their environment, culture, and the future.&nbsp;In the qualitative research, the interviews were moderated by the Istanbul Economy Research team. Çiğdem Erol, Tuğba Türkkan and Elif Dilara Kara took part in the research.&nbsp;In the panel where Turkey Report Director Can Selçuki shared the results of the research, Prof. Dr. Demet Lüküslü, Head of Sociology Department at Yeditepe University, Alphan Telek, Development Program Director of Istanbul Institute for Political Research (IstanPol), Nevzat Taşcı, Campaign Director of Arayüz Campaign and Orhun Akdağ, Executive Board Member of Istanbul City Council, discussed the reasons for the results and their possible effects, and shared ideas for solving the problems of young people.&nbsp;So what are these findings? As for the research findings, the first finding is that young people do not adopt the generalisation of ‘Generation Z.’ It is pointed out that this concept, which is not binding for young people, is used by advertisers, brands, and politicians. Can Selçuki says, ‘We have seen that identity politics is not the main motivation among the young people we talked to. We see that the identity barrier is being broken down through rational preference sets.’ He summarises the situation by stating that young people are not aliens and that there is no group of young people isolated from society.&nbsp;In addition, another element in the findings that shows that the definition of ‘Generation Z’ is wrong is that people between the ages of 18 and 30 experience the same problems as the rest of the society. The main problems of the respondents are listed as follows:&nbsp;<ul fr-original-style="padding-inline-start: 20px;" style="padding-inline-start: 20px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1em; list-style-position: inside; box-sizing: border-box;"><li dir="ltr" fr-original-style="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">Economy</li><li dir="ltr" fr-original-style="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">Politics&nbsp;</li><li dir="ltr" fr-original-style="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">Social crises</li></ul>Economy: Economic problems are summarised as ‘unemployment,’ ‘high costs’ and ‘refugees.’ It is underlined that the ‘domestic and national’ discourse in the economy is associated with development, and it is also stated that a cause-and-effect relationship is tried to be established between economic problems and social crises.&nbsp;Merit:&nbsp;It is pointed out that the concept of merit is at the intersection of the three problems mentioned above. When asked to explain the concept of merit, most of the participants gave incorrect answers. It leads to the conclusion that a concept is criticised based on the structure it is formed as in the mind. Merit is defined as a concept that is not applied to the society in general, but rather as a concept that individuals ‘apply only to their own.’ Even according to this wrong definition, it is said that merit is not taken as a basis.&nbsp;Trust in institutions:&nbsp;In the survey conducted in November 2021, the Turkish Armed Forces, police, and NGOs were the most trusted institutions, while sects and political parties were the least trusted; in this year's survey, when asked this question without any choice, the majority did not name any institution. Selçuki said: ‘This shows a deeper rupture. They do not trust any institution of the system.’The problem of not being able to dream:&nbsp;It is observed that young people are unable to dream due to economic and social crises. The fact that young people express that they are experiencing ‘uncertainty’ and ‘anxiety’ about the future supports this; however, it is stated in the research that the inability to dream is not a new problem. 10 years ago, this problem existed especially in Anatolian cities due to socio-economic and cultural reasons; however, it is underlined that it has spread throughout the country today.Citizenship: It is interpreted that the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey has been devalued as an effect of all that has happened (distrust in institutions, inability to dream, etc.). The easy access to residence permits for asylum-seekers, which is seen as a factor in economic problems, and the facilitation of granting citizenship to foreigners are among the factors affecting this devaluation.&nbsp;Democracy According to the research, although young people advocate democracy, they want it for their norms and groups. On the other hand, the majority want authoritarianism rather than democracy because they think that the functioning of institutions is not right.&nbsp;Human rights:&nbsp;Human rights are perceived as an ‘abstract and vague’ concept, and the survey reveals that most of the responses emphasise ‘justice.’ It is emphasised that most respondents have difficulty distinguishing between democracy and human rights.&nbsp;Migration:&nbsp;The respondents who intend to migrate mostly state that they want to migrate to practice their profession, to gain money and experience, or due to social crises. The majority of the participants want to migrate to western countries.&nbsp;Evaluations&nbsp;In the panel discussion following the presentation, Alphan Telek, Nevzat Taşcı, Orhun Akdağ, and Can Selçuki evaluated the results with the guidance of Demet Lüküslü.Alphan Telek, Director of the IstanPol Development Program, drew attention to the problem of not being able to dream and said, ‘This has not only affected young people in their 20s, but also children as young as 12. For example, a child says, 'My dream is to become an engineer when I grow up and settle in Germany.' Why is that? First of all, Turkey's bad economic management and economic crisis. We cannot find the welfare we want. There is precariousness in Turkey, it is common to all of us. This situation has consequences such as the desire to go abroad. The second is authoritarianism. It is so heavy that it does not give room for advancement. Unless there is a change, these paths will be completely closed. People feel that there is no possibility to move up a class. There was a time when they used to say 'Read, son, don't be like us. Now, this generation thinks that they cannot rise even if they study in this period.’Nevzat Taşcı, Campaign Director of the Arayüz Campaign, said, ‘The young undecided voters have started to be forgotten. Focusing on the problems faced by young people will also enable politicians to move forward. They should focus on today's youth, not the problems of their youth.’ Taşcı then focused on the results regarding the concepts and said, ‘We fill in the bottom of the concepts ourselves. Therefore, when we come together, we have problems creating common ground. NGOs are very significant at this point. It is necessary to use the increased trust in NGOs in the right way. Young people think that if they enter politics, their labour and intellectual power will be used; if they do not succeed in NGOs, the institution falls into despair. However, this is not the case, it is necessary to get out of this idea. We need to come together.’Can Selçuki, Director of the Turkey Report, states that the results show that a populist wave can rise over the youth in Turkey. Expressing that he thinks that the populist wave that may occur today may grow even more over time, Selçuki underlines that different concerns will arise at that point.&nbsp;Editor's note&nbsp;I believe that the results of the panel we watched are a mirror of the fact that young people between the ages of 18 and 30 are no longer ‘tolerant.’ This research shows that individuals in this age range, who spent their youth with various restrictions on freedom, and economic and social crises, want to achieve their welfare first and then their peace of mind. As a result of this intolerance, they demand that concepts such as democracy and human rights be used in their favor ‘as they see it.’ Other interesting results are that this age group wants justice rather than equality.&nbsp;In light of all these evaluations, it is highly probable that the participant age group will start to move away from politics and will likewise move away from society. However, Turkey's young population is an extremely valuable group for this country. For this reason, politicians must first prove that they value them and then restore their reputations. Young people need to be both reintegrated into society and made to believe that they can have a future in this country.&nbsp;

A young perspective on Turkey's future

Abdullah EsinThe thorn-filled road of the opposition: Opposition in the State of EmergencyFollowing the July 15 coup attempt, a state of emergency (SoE) was declared across Turkey on July 20, which was extended seven times until July 19, 2018. Although the main goal of this move was to fight terrorist organisations, especially FETÖ, Turkish politics was redesigned under the State of Emergency, and even today there is an opposition that struggles within the political boundaries drawn at the time.At the beginning of 2016, the state of emergency designed a new political arena that silenced all social opposition, made the national security and survival discourse the reference point of politics, atomised and pacified civil society, forced citizens to adopt only the political ideology of the government instead of depoliticising them, and confined opposition parties within these boundaries. Although the state of emergency officially ended in 2018, the public sphere, which was first subjugated and then redesigned to ensure the continued rule of the AKP and President Erdoğan, still determines the possibilities and limits of the politics today.The political arena, imprisoned in the discourse of national security and survival, does not give space to any political party, civil society organization, or idea that does not serve the political benefitss of the government, and even classifies them as terrorists, as a threat to national security. Since President Erdoğan is the sole authority to decide how to ensure national security and protect the nation's survival in the new political arena under the domination of the state of emergency, he also decides which idea is reasonable or which politician is a terrorist. The threat (!) to the regime can be quickly eliminated through the security-judiciary mechanism by removing it from politics and civilian life.The thorn-filled path of the oppositionSince the sole guardian of national security is President Erdoğan and the AKP regime, the ruling party and the state apparatus are identified with each other, converting Turkey into a party state. While this political order creates an unlimited political advantage for the ruling party and a frightening state power to eliminate its rivals, it also creates an impossible and thorn-filled path for the opposition. Every step taken, every policy implemented and every mistake made by the ruling party is legitimised under the title of national security and survival, while corruption cases, wrong policies, or political scandals brought up by the opposition can be branded as treason and pushed out of legitimate (!) politics.The political arena, whose borders are determined in accordance with the benefits of the governing party, has a great impact on opposition parties, especially the six-party table, being incapable of voicing the problems of the society, producing a new and solution-oriented discourse, and the ongoing state of emergency politics with a great loss of momentum in recent months, despite the severe economic crisis of today and the AKP-MHP government which has long outlived its political life. So, in an atmosphere where politics is highly quenched and all opposition voices are shackled, should we see the frustration, ineffectiveness, and incompetence of the opposition parties as reasonable?The claim to build a democratic regimeEstablished with the ambitious goal of not only winning the 2023 elections, but also rebuilding the democratic regime in Turkey, the sextet set out on this journey knowing the extremely narrow boundaries of politics and the high cost of opposition. Although the economic crisis, which began to intensify in October 2021, and the mental fatigue of the AKP government gave the opposition a great momentum in a short period, they did not attempt to transform the political arena and expand the boundaries of politics in this process.&nbsp;Today, we see an opposition that wasted the advantage that the economic crisis created for the opposition and returned to where it started as a result of President Erdoğan's moves, like a prodigal who spent their inheritance in a short period. The picture that has emerged in a short period shows that the opposition can neither build a democratic regime nor win the 2023 elections without expanding the boundaries of politics and raising issues banned by the government.CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's political moves, which have been heavily debated in recent months, have clearly shown us the cost of practicing politics in the narrow space defined by the government. Kılıçdaroğlu's visit to the United States while the disinformation law was being debated in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and his proposal to legalise the headscarf are concrete examples of how opposition politics cannot succeed without expanding its boundaries.In Turkey, which currently ranks 149th out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index and is one of the countries with the highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world, social media has created an enormous advantage for opposition parties to make their voices heard, and it has become one of the latest targets of the government. The ruling party, which has taken politics under its sway with the ‘disinformation law’ passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, is also trying to take information and truth under its sway.This law, under which every news and opinion that is not in the interest of the government can be characterised as disinformation and opposing voices can be suppressed, further narrows the already narrow space for opposition under the state of emergency politics and brings it almost to the point of extinction. While the CHP, as the main opposition party and the biggest cooperator in the six-party table of candidates to govern the country, was expected to resist the passage of this law with all its might, the CHP leader went on a visit to the US, which was widely debated both for its content and timing. He responded to the criticism with the following words:<blockquote fr-original-style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px;" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px; margin: 0px 0px 1em; border-left-style: solid; box-sizing: border-box;">‘There are those who say, 'Why did you go when the censorship law was being voted? Criticism and critics have always been above my head. But I thought about it before these votes. Either we would go to the Parliament and fight as usual, but the palace would pass the law with the numerical majority it has. In other words, this process would be completed without saying anything new to the youth. Or I was going to make young people see that a new Turkey is possible. I chose this path.’</blockquote>With such a statement, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, in a way, accepts that the limits of the opposition are set by the government and that it is not possible to resist it. How can it be acceptable that a person who claims to be the leader of the opposition and to lead the country after the 2023 elections cannot overcome the limits dictated by the government and fight for his voters? Does an opposition that accepts defeat from the beginning when it is expected to resist the disinformation law together with all opposition parties have the resilience to rebuild the democratic regime?What kind of opposition can create a new Turkey?Kılıçdaroğlu's proposal to ‘legalise the headscarf’ is the clearest example of the AKP's inability to oppose in a field that it sees as one of the most outstanding achievements of its 20-year rule and whose boundaries are completely determined by itself. Kılıçdaroğlu's call was immediately responded to by President Erdoğan and the ruling party, which came up with a referendum proposal.This bill was not only about the headscarf, but also about the protection of the family structure and LGBTQIA+ rights, creating a powerful weapon for the ruling party to use identity politics to the fullest. The recent leak of backstage information that the referendum would be held on the same day as the 2023 elections showed the limits of Kılıçdaroğlu's opposition strategy. Erdoğan, who aims at carrying identity politics, one of the key points of social polarisation, to the referendum on the day of the elections, is devising an electoral strategy in which he can win the votes of undecided conservatives by attracting undecided voters and those who do not plan to go to the polls.CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's opposition strategy, which started with the halalisation discourse and continued with the headscarf proposal, showed that the opposition cannot succeed without going beyond a political arena whose boundaries are drawn by the ruling party. Although the cost of opposition in Turkey under the state of emergency, which has officially ended but continues de facto, is increasing, neither winning the 2023 elections nor rebuilding the democratic regime is possible by struggling in a political arena confined to national security and identity politics.Only an opposition that refuses to dissent to the extent allowed by the government, that takes into account the attacks on citizens' lifestyles, the violence and bullying that have made this country unlivable for many, the economic crisis whose impact is increasing day by day, and the demand for a democratic transformation, and shouts out boldly for it, can create a new Turkey.

 The thorn-filled road of opposition: Opposition in the State of Emergency

Just a few months ago, the AKP government, led by President Erdoğan, could not find concrete solutions to the economic crisis in Turkey and take any action to improve the living conditions of its citizens. It was challenging to convince the public of its growth-oriented economic model based on low-interest rates. Although different polling companies reported different percentages, they all showed a growing group of undecided voters who were breaking away from the government.In this period, the opposition, which had the psychological vantage in politics, was announcing principled positions through six-party meetings. The opposition's collaboration was exalting the society. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was striking the agenda with the corruption-related videos he posted on social media in the middle of the night. Although Kılıçdaroğlu's economic promises, which resonated with the public, were implemented by the government, Kılıçdaroğlu was taking the credit.İYİ Party leader Meral Akşener was highlighting the vital problems of citizens with her visits to shopkeepers and setting the agenda with her speeches at group meetings. The rallies organised by the CHP and the İYİ Party, as well as the DEVA Party, brought together masses in different Anatolian cities demanding a change of government and boosted the morale of those in favour of a change. In the eyes of the society and international public, it was almost certain that the government would change in the 2023 elections, and there were even warnings to the opposition not to get complacent.The change in the government's position and the return of swing votersPresident Erdoğan shifted for the first time from the position of a leader who denied hardship in June to a leader who acknowledged the problems and took steps to solve them. In this period, which started with an interim increase in the minimum wage, steps such as increasing social benefits and starting a social housing project were taken. The EYT (retirement age victims) regulation and ‘salary increases that will not crush the inflation’ were promised.Opinion polls do not show that opposition voters are turning toward the government, but they do show that swing voters who broke away from the AKP have started to turn toward the AKP again. In June 2022, a Metropoll Research poll showed that 55% of voters who voted for the AKP in the last election thought that the economy was poorly managed. The percentage of AKP voters who said ‘the economy is being managed well’ was 42.1%. The same poll shows that only three months later, in September 2022, the percentage of AKP voters who were satisfied with the management of the economy rose to 68.7%, while the percentage of those who were not dropped to 27.3%.Meanwhile, the opposition, which had been on the rise for a long time, seems to have entered a period of stagnation.The six-party alliance appears to be stagnatingThe six parties that have agreed on a transition to a strengthened parliamentary system have repeatedly expressed their intention to field a joint candidate, but have not named one. The opposition, which has voiced the problematic aspects of the system and prepared an alternative model, has not clarified how the country will be governed under the new system. Under the current system, the president, who will be elected as the head of the executive, is the key to how the country will be governed, but there is no candidate; therefore, no governing program. There are no common and definite policies on foreign policy, social policies, or economic management, only statements of principled consensus.The fact that there is no consensus on a candidate just months before the election, and that the parties are sending implicit or explicitly harsh messages to one another, may raise questions about the opposition's capacity to jointly govern the country, especially among the decisive group of voters characterised as swing voters. There is uncertainty about what Turkey would look like if the opposition wins the elections. It is difficult to convince people who are not already convinced of change to accept a risky and uncertain change.The İYİ Party climbed up in the polls for a long time and moved to the centre-right. However, to maintain its claim to govern, it needs to reach out to new voter groups. The DEVA Party, the Gelecek (Future) Party, the Saadet (Felicity) Party, and the Democrat Party are not yet getting as many votes from the ruling electorate as they target.The CHP, which has made a meaningful effort to break the ice with conservatives with Kılıçdaroğlu's halalisation policy, has not yet achieved its goal of becoming the first party. While the disinformation law, which was interpreted as an attempt to silence the social opposition before the last elections, was passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Kılıçdaroğlu met with scientists and students in the US instead of making a speech from the rostrum of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, leading to comments that the CHP is way off beam. While it would be possible to reach the increasingly impoverished people with social democratic promises from a class perspective, Kılıçdaroğlu is stuck in identity politics with promises such as legal guarantees for headscarves. He is competing with the government on identity. Despite his theoretical criticism of neoliberalism, he has yet to make the CHP the first party in the provinces and shantytowns.Kılıçdaroğlu also shows that he does not ignore these critiques with his message ‘Wait for November. Wait for Mr. Kemal.’ And explains in detail why he was in the US while the disinformation law was being discussed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Kılıçdaroğlu shows that he does not ignore these critiques.A joint candidate may already be announcedIf the six-party alliance wants to turn the wind back in its favour, it can try to announce a common name as a candidate and a common governance program with a big campaign. If all six parties can be seen to be united around both the candidate and the program, it may be possible to talk about a tangible change for people.A joint communication strategy can already send clear and strong messages to all segments of the society on economy, security, freedoms, and foreign policy. If the opposition is serious about nominating a common candidate and governing the country together, it should be able to remove the question marks in the minds of the public about the change.However, time is being wasted with principled position papers and confusing messages against an opponent with a clear name and program. The MHP's use of the slogan ‘The right candidate is clear, the decision is clear’ in its Anatolian rallies shows that the People's Alliance (Millet İttifakı) will try to consolidate its voters with the argument that the opposition will bring uncertainty. &nbsp;According to the results of the research conducted by Yöneylem, the most common answer to the question ‘Which party can solve Turkey's problems?’ is ‘none’ with 36%. In other words, society oscillates between despair and conviction.As Bekir Ağırdır writes, ‘Most of the society is waiting for the opposition, they want to hear a voice, a word, but we will see if the opposition wants to listen to a new voice, a new word first, and then establish a new voice.’

Joint candidate, joint program, right now

The censorship law was published in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) last night and entered into force. More precisely, except for some articles that will enter into force as of April 1, 2023, Article 29, which is a direct violation of freedom of thought and expression and imposes prison sentences on the owners of expressions that the government does not like, entered into force immediately.Although it is said to have been prepared in consultation with the undersecretary of the US Embassy, the statements, reactions and realities belie the claim that ‘Turkey has enacted a law that is an example for the world.’The disinformation law opened its eyes to the world with the government's disinformation.&nbsp;The US said they did not have a similar law.The United Nations condemned the law. Marta Hurtado, the spokesperson for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said, ‘Under international human rights law, freedom of expression is not limited to truthful information, but includes all forms of information and opinion.’The UN spokesperson emphasised that the Turkish law ‘contravenes the article on the right of the people to information’ in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also condemned the law. In a joint statement, international press freedom organisations opposed the law, particularly on the grounds of Article 29, which violates press freedom.In Turkey, independent journalists and their organisations, as well as opposition parties, have also said that the law targets not only journalists but society as a whole.Facilitating access to informationFreedom House, a non-governmental organization defending freedom and human rights, publishes annual reports on freedoms around the world. In its 2022 report on Internet freedom, the organisation states:<blockquote fr-original-style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px;" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); border-color: rgb(37, 44, 60); border-width: 4px; font-style: italic; padding-left: 10px; margin: 0px 0px 1em; border-left-style: solid; box-sizing: border-box;">‘The fight against disinformation and propaganda depends on public access to reliable information and news from the ground. Democracies should step up efforts to develop independent online media at home and abroad with financial support, create financial models, technological support and professional development.’</blockquote>There is no need for prison sentences to prevent the public from being exposed to fake news.The only thing that needs to be done is to establish a transparent communication system to ensure that the media, and therefore the public, have access to accurate news.By calling the silencing law ‘disinformation’, the government is trying to demagogue that those who reveal the truth and criticise the government are ‘out of the loop, with a foreign name’.As if this was not enough, the Directorate of Communication has started publishing ‘disinformation’ reports every week. &nbsp;They address prosecutors.Restrictions on freedom of expression thought and the press does not only affect journalists and activists. The private sector, entrepreneurs, science, academia, and healthcare sector are also affected by this toxic environment.Bans backfire in IranIn Iran, the demonstrations that started with women's riot faced a very harsh reaction from the regime.As in previous demonstrations, the Internet was restricted again and this time access to WhatsApp and Instagram was banned.But the riot has not been extinguished.The demonstrations continue to grow.The Instagram bans also had economic consequences. There are reports that more than 450 online businesses have closed, many workers have been laid off, and 4 million people and their families are facing economic hardship.In many regions, workers, shopkeepers, and traders are now joining the women's riot.&nbsp;According to official reports, 240 people have lost their lives in Iran.But they cannot do it, they cannot suppress the voice of the people.In no period of history could the truth be covered up by pressure, persecution, imprisonment, and tyranny.Those who feared the truth lost, and those who tried to work from their dark corners were sooner or later left alone with their shame.Because the truth is free, it does not shut up when told to ‘shut up.’

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