Among the political events that have marked the past two weeks, Devlet Bahçeli's threatening announcement of a list containing the identities of 154 individuals stands out. It is understood that those included in the list by name and surname are people who do not share the same views as the MHP regarding the murder of Sinan Ateş, the former President of the Grey Wolves' Hearths, and the way the investigation and prosecution were conducted, or who imply that there is a connection between this murder and certain executives of the MHP.Indeed, Bahçeli stated: "[These individuals] have made great injustices, slanders, lies, contempt, and accusations against the Nationalist Movement Party. The total number of these people is 154. (...) We find it difficult to accept them, but we are closely monitoring them. The list here is a compilation of who spoke when, at what time, on which program, how they spoke, with whom they spoke, and what insults they directed at the MHP. This file is in our hands. When the time comes, this file will be put into action. (...) We do not even accept engaging with them, but we will certainly confront them within the legal framework."Although Bahçeli appears to be referring to a legal reckoning, this incident still reflects the grave situation of press and freedom of expression in our country and is discouraging in terms of Turkey's chances for democratization. Furthermore, considering the established belief within the MHP that even presenting different views, let alone openly criticizing them, is a matter of courage, Bahçeli's statement is also alarming.Another prominent incident is the acceptance by the ruling majority in the legislative committee of the bill proposing the "extermination" of stray animals, disregarding the opposition's objections and contrary public opinion. If the bill, known in the public as the "Extermination Law," becomes law, metropolitan municipalities, provincial municipalities, and municipalities with a population exceeding 25,000 will be required to establish animal shelters by the end of the year to care for and rehabilitate "stray" animals until they are adopted. Given that President Erdoğan instructed his party group to finalize this issue before the parliamentary judicial recess, it can be confidently expected that this bill will be accepted in Parliament without significant changes.However, it is not unlikely that many municipalities, either to avoid the significant burden it would bring or - primarily AKP municipalities - due to their definite dislike of animals, may evade their responsibilities and take the shortcut of euthanizing the animals. The most concerning point here is that when it comes to issues related to stray animals, the first thing that comes to the AKP government's mind is not to seek a humane and civilized solution but to think of exterminating the animals, which they see as the source of the problem. If the logic applied to dogs for public order and security issues were correct, the same "easy solution" would need to be used by people who disrupt public order and security!Another source of concern regarding the issue of stray dogs is that the government might be using this opportunity to turn the anti-animal atmosphere it has spread into a campaign against "luxury-loving, elitist" animal lovers, who are typically assumed to be CHP supporters, creating hostility against them within its own base. This atmosphere can be used as a stepping stone to conclude that the views of animal lovers (and the CHP) on other (political) issues are also not worth considering.The ruling party's "my way or the highway" stance, which disregards any criticism and suggestions on this matter, is highly discouraging and even alarming for the country's hopes for democratization. It is disturbing because a political team that habitually ignores the views and criticisms of the opposition and the fundamental trends in society may eventually tend to disregard the rights of those whose opinions they ignore.In any case, by placing the issue of stray animals at the center of the political agenda, the Erdoğan-Bahçeli administration seems to have succeeded in both making people temporarily forget about the real agenda of the country, such as the high cost of living and the struggle of broad segments of society to make ends meet, and in consolidating its base to some extent by polarizing society.Meanwhile, the government appears to have developed a new formula to exact "revenge" on CHP municipalities for the loss of municipalities in the March 31 elections. Accordingly, the collection of accumulated debts of municipalities will begin. Practically, this means putting pressure on municipalities transitioning from AKP to CHP to pay off the exorbitant debts inherited from the AKP. The AKP leadership likely aims to expose the CHP as "inept" and "drowning in debt" if the CHP municipalities fail to pay these debts within the desired timeframe. As with the issue of stray animals, they likely see this as a way to consolidate their base.Lastly, let's conclude this article with two unfortunate news related to the economy. The Financial Times has highlighted that the recent influx of foreign hot money into Turkey could quickly exit in the face of potential global or local shocks. Under the headline "Traders pour billions of dollars into Turkish lira," it was emphasized that funds are flowing into Turkey to take advantage of high interest rates. Still, this situation could leave the country vulnerable to sudden market changes. Meanwhile, a Deutsche Bank report predicts that monthly inflation will rise due to price increases in July and August, automatic tax increases on fuel, alcohol, and tobacco, and wage increases for public employees and retirees. You will find a detailed assessment of the state of the economy in Caner Gerek's article.See you in our next issue.

The Freedom Observer

Understanding and explaining election economics practices in Turkey is quite challenging. This is because elections occur very frequently, and as a result, there are short intervals between them. Consequently, in Turkey, elections take place under all kinds of economic circumstances. In other words, Turkey holds elections during economic crises as well as during seemingly stable periods. Alongside this remarkable (!) experience, Turkey has gained experience in election economics practices. It is not possible to thoroughly explain all these practices in this section of our bulletin, but we will attempt to provide a somewhat superficial overview within a broad framework. However, before delving into these practices, let's take a glance at the dizzying election schedule starting from the governmental system change referendum held in 2017.On April 16, 2017, Turkey transitioned from a parliamentary system to a "presidential government system" through a referendum.[2] Approximately one year later, on June 24, 2018, the Presidential election was held.[3] This election also included parliamentary elections. Less than a year after this election, on March 31, 2019, local elections were held.[4] These elections were particularly contentious in Istanbul. This is because Ekrem İmamoğlu, the candidate of the Republican People's Party (CHP) for Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, surprisingly won the election with only a 16,000-vote margin (at that time, there were around 10.5 million voters in Istanbul).[5] However, due to the narrow margin, Justice and Development Party officials alleged electoral fraud and applied to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) for the annulment of the election and demanded a rerun.[6]At this point, it may be necessary to make a parenthesis about Erdoğan's approach to elections. Erdoğan views elections not as a reflection of the will of the people but rather as a means to secure the legitimacy of his own power. Although this stance does not necessarily change the manner in which elections are conducted, it profoundly influences the political atmosphere leading up to the elections and the nature of the elections themselves. Erdoğan's constant emphasis on respecting elections and regarding them as the sole reflection of societal will was a reinforcing factor in the belief that he would accept election results regardless of the outcome for a long time. However, the cancellation of the highly politicized 2019 Istanbul elections by the heavily politicized Supreme Election Council (YSK) deeply shook this belief. Rumors even surfaced about Erdoğan not accepting election results if he were not elected in the 2023 Presidential Elections and resorting to different means to hold onto power. Of course, these rumors were accompanied by allegations of election irregularities. The image of Erdoğan, who was seen as respecting election results, was shattered mainly. Let's close this parenthesis here and continue to examine the dizzying election schedule.Following the cancellation of the initial elections held on March 31 in Istanbul, Turkey's largest city and a global metropolis, a second election took place on June 23, 2019. CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu once again won the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality with an increased margin of around 700,000 votes.[7] After these elections, Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on May 14, 2023. [8][9]&nbsp;So, since 2017 and onwards, Turkey has gone to the ballot box a total of four times in the marathon of government system changes, conducting six different types of elections within this period. It feels like there has been almost an election every year. Now, preparations are underway for the local elections on March 31, 2024. Thus, the election marathon continues at full speed. In our next bulletin, we will focus on the election economy practices accompanying this marathon, with a focus on the 2024 elections. <hr fr-original-style="" style="height: 0px; overflow: visible; border-bottom: none; clear: both; user-select: none; break-after: page; box-sizing: border-box;"> 1 Dunja Mijatovic, “Memorandum on freedom of expression and of the media, human rights defenders and civil society in Türkiye”, şuradan erişilebilir: https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-of-the-media-human-rights-defe/1680aebf3d2 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/16-nisan-2017-anayasa-degisikligi-halkoylamasi/50023 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/24-haziran-2018-secimleri/775364 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/24-haziran-2018-secimleri/775365 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/31-mart-2019-mahalli-i%CC%87dareler-secimi/779166 https://acikveri.ysk.gov.tr/secim-sonuc-istatistik/secim-sonuc7https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2019MahalliIdareler/KesinSecimSonuclari/2019Mahalli-IBB.pdf8 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/14-mayis-2023-secimleri/824919 https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/14-mayis-2023-secimleri/82491<a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" target="_blank" title="" fr-original-style="" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent; outline: none; cursor: pointer; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; touch-action: manipulation; user-select: auto; box-sizing: border-box;"></a><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" target="_blank" title="" fr-original-style="" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent; outline: none; cursor: pointer; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; touch-action: manipulation; user-select: auto; box-sizing: border-box;"></a><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" target="_blank" title="" fr-original-style="" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent; outline: none; cursor: pointer; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; touch-action: manipulation; user-select: auto; box-sizing: border-box;"></a><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" target="_blank" title="" fr-original-style="" style="color: rgb(9, 9, 9); text-decoration: none; background-color: transparent; outline: none; cursor: pointer; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; touch-action: manipulation; user-select: auto; box-sizing: border-box;"></a>

Consequently, in Turkey, elections take place under all kinds of economic circumstances.

Election Marathon and Electoral Economics in Turkey (I)

Following these words, a defamation campaign was launched against Fincancı in the media close to the government, and an investigation was launched against her by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. Fincancı, who participated in the said program while she was in Germany, returned to Turkey and, through her lawyers, stated that she was ready to give a statement to the prosecutor's office. Despite this, Fincancı was detained in Istanbul, taken to Ankara, and arrested on 26 October. In addition, an investigation has also been initiated on the Turkish Medical Association.The objections of Fincancı's lawyers against the detention on the grounds that the conditions of detention were not met, there was no strong suspicion of a crime against her, and there were no grounds for her detention were rejected. In the indictment prepared by the Prosecutor's Office, it was demanded that Fincancı be sentenced to up to 7.5 years in prison for "propagandizing for a terrorist organization". Ankara 4th High Penal Court gave a decision of lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Fincancı's residence address is Istanbul. The first hearing of the trial held within the framework of the indictment accepted by the Istanbul 24th High Penal Court was held on 23 December. Due to Fincancı's wish to actually attend the hearing, her transportation from Ankara to Istanbul was carried out by land route. Fincancı's request to be transferred by plane due to her health problems was rejected by the Ministry of Justice.The Ministry of National Defense requested to participate in the proceedings as an intervening party, and the request for intervention was rejected by the court. The court's decision to limit the defense to a maximum of three lawyers was appealed, and this objection was rejected by the court. Following the defense against the indictment, the prosecutor's office requested punishment from the upper line. An additional time was requested by the defense against the prosecutor’s opinion, and the request for release was rejected by the court, and one week was given for the defense.In the second hearing held on December 29th, the court's dismissal was requested as all the requests were rejected without justification. In the defense on the merits, it was stated that the elements of the crime of propagating the force and violent methods of the terrorist organization did not occur and that Fincancı's statements as a forensic expert that the allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons should be investigated by independent bodies are in accordance with international law standards, thus could not be described as propaganda. It was also stated that Fincancı’s statements are protected within the scope of freedom of expression. The court dismissed the delegation's request for refusal and the request for release, and the hearing was adjourned to 11 January.At the third hearing on January 11, the court sentenced Fincancı to a conviction for making propaganda for a terrorist organization and was sentenced to 2 years, 8 months ,and 15 days in prison. Following the conviction, it was decided to release Fincancı. The decision is subject to the divisional court of appeal and supreme court of appeal’s review.In the second hearing held on 29 December, the court's dismissal was requested as all the requests were rejected without justification. In the defense on the merits, it was stated that the elements of the crime of propagating the force and violent methods of the terrorist organization did not occur and that Fincancı's statement as a forensic medicine expert that the allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons should be investigated by independent bodies in accordance with international law standards could not be described as propaganda, and it was protected within the scope of freedom of expression. The court dismissed the delegation's request for refusal and the request for release, and the hearing was adjourned to 11 January.At the third hearing on January 11, the court sentenced Fincancı to a conviction for making propaganda for a terrorist organization and was sentenced to 2 years, 8 months, and 15 days in prison. Following the conviction, it was decided to release Fincancı. The decision is subject to appeal and appeal review.Fincancı’s case, who is a forensic expert and the President of the Turkish Medical Association, is a clear indicator of Turkey's poor record of freedom of expression. This became crystal-clear when she was arrested and sentenced for her statements regarding the allegations of the use of chemical weapons should be investigated by independent bodies. It is also clear that the whole judicial process strengthens the concerns about the independence of the judiciary.

President of the Turkish Medical Association, Prof. Dr. Şebnem Korur Fincancı, was sentenced to 2 years, 8 months, and 15 days in prison by the Istanbul 24th High Penal Court at the hearing held on January 11, 2023, in the case where she was tried for the crime of making propaganda for a terrorist organization. Fincancı, who is a forensic expert, said in a television program that the allegations that chemical weapons were used in the operations carried out by the Turkish army in Northern Iraq in October should be investigated by independent committees. Korur Fincancı, who stated that there were people with convulsions and involuntary movements in the images shown to her, reminded her that international conventions should be implemented. She stated that when such a claim arises under the Convention of Banning the Use of Chemical Weapons, the research to be conducted must comply with the principles of the Minnesota Protocol.

TTB President Prof. Korur Fincancı Sentenced to Prison

Professor Emeritus Ülker Gökberk published a book recently that brought Walter Benjamin's Berlin and Bilge Karasu's Istanbul together. We talked about this togetherness that crosses space and time.

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